Abstract:Security evaluations inherently depend on stable identifiers. Any finding, audit, or regulatory decision must remain attached to the specific artifact it pertains to. Continuously updated artificial intelligence systems violate this core assumption, with public model designations remaining static while underlying weights, prompts, retrieval mechanisms, misuse classifiers, inference settings, and serving infrastructures undergo unannounced modifications. Consequently, current evaluations frequently apply to superficial labels rather than identifiable and distinct systems.
To resolve this, we propose referential security as a new paradigm for AI evaluation. The fundamental security question extends beyond whether a model is safe to whether subsequent parties can conclusively determine which system a specific safety claim addressed. This approach reframes model identity as an empirically verifiable property and separates referential stability from the substantive security claims it conditions. This framework brings tractability to three critical workflows that current practices handle poorly. Specifically, it enables reproducible evaluation, longitudinal audit validity, and cross-provider equivalence. By grounding these evaluations in verifiable artifacts, our approach ensures that safety audits and regulatory findings maintain their empirical utility across the operational lifecycle of dynamic systems.
| Subjects: | Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2605.25673 [cs.CR] |
| (or arXiv:2605.25673v1 [cs.CR] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.25673 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
From: Dan Ristea [view email]
[v1]
Mon, 25 May 2026 10:24:10 UTC (33 KB)
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