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OpenSSL HollowByte: A DoS Hiding in 11 Bytes Datadog and Okta Combine for New Customer Detections Detecting OpenClaw at Sign-In Okta Pooled Security Audits: a One-Year Retrospective Account Recovery, without Password Resets Okta’s Response to React2Shell Uncloaking VoidProxy: a Novel and Evasive Phishing-as-a-Service Framework Attackers Target Hotelier Accounts in Malvertising and Phishing Campaign Using Auth0 Logs for Proactive Threat Detection Controlling Cross-App Data Sprawl in Google Workspace How this ClickFix campaign leads to Redline Stealer Paving the Path: Pooled Audits with Okta Security Building Confidence in Support Comms with Caller Verify at Okta Enabling ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Compliance with Okta Okta’s Secure by Design Pledge - One Year On Leveraging Okta System Logs for Proactive Threat Detection Enhancing Customer Trust Through a Comprehensive Audit Program Okta's new Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) A Guide to DORA Compliance with Okta How AI services power the DPRK’s IT contracting scams Detect and Prevent Cross Device Authentication How Responsible Disclosures are Shaping a Safer Cyberspace Cybersecurity’s Next Gen Next.js CVE-2025-29927 CSO Conversations: Matthew Hansen, Regional CSO of Americas West Empowering Security with Customer Trust Solutions Putting Security First with Secure Development One trick finds the root of any Okta troubles CSO Conversations: Stephen McDermid, Regional CSO of EMEA Content-Security-Policy in a Complex Environment CSO Conversations: Keiko Itakura, Regional CSO of Japan How Okta Embraces Identity Verification Using Persona CSO Conversations: Matt Immler, Regional CSO of Americas East Raising the Bar for our Industry with IPSIE Cyber-Safety over the Holidays Okta Social Engineering Impersonation Report - Response and Recommendation Five Reasons to Upgrade your Org to Okta Identity Engine Okta’s Ongoing Commitment to Secure By Design Unveiling the Essence of the Security Customer Trust Function Security Education Through the Art of Storytelling Seven Ways to Reduce Super Admins in Okta The Case for Zero Standing Privileges FastPass: The battle-hardened authenticator Detecting Cross-Origin Authentication Credential Stuffing Attacks How to Block Anonymizing Services using Okta Why Cyber-heroes need a Zero Trust CAEP! Okta Verify Vulnerability Disclosure Report - Response and Remediation Defensive Domain Registration is a Mug’s Game Protecting Administrative Sessions in Okta How to Secure the SaaS Apps of the Future Okta October 2023 Security Incident Investigation Closure October Customer Support Security Incident - Update and Recommended Actions Unauthorized Access to Okta's Support Case Management System: Root Cause and Remediation Tracking Unauthorized Access to Okta's Support System Go “Secure by Default” With Custom Admin Roles for IT support staff Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection BYO Telephony and the future of SMS at Okta Saying “No Thanks” to nOAuth Telling More Okta Detection Stories with Google Chronicle An Unexpected Endorsement for WebAuthn Social Engineering is Getting More Extreme, but the Fixes Can Be Simple Study up on Okta Logs for Splunk’s Boss of the SOC! Keeping Phishing Adversaries Out of the Middle Using Workflows to Respond to Anomalous Push Requests Okta and Splunk Combine to Detect Common Attacks Setting the Right Levels of Assurance for Zero Trust Catch-All's and Canary Rules User Sign-in and Recovery Events in the Okta System Log Okta Code Repositories Detecting Real-Time Phishing Attacks Detecting Real-Time Phishing Attacks Okta’s Response to OpenSSL Security Update Monitoring for Abuse of Administrative Privileges System Log: a Window into Supporting the Okta Cloud The Human Factor in Phishing Resistance Auth0 Code Repository Archives From 2020 and Earlier Phishing Resistance and Why it Matters Detecting Scatter Swine: Insights into a Relentless Phishing Campaign Defending against Session Hijacking Unlocking the Mystery of 700+ Okta System Log Events Official Okta Statement on LAPSUS$ Claims Protection, without perimeters We (still) need to talk about RDP Just How Risky is Legacy Authentication?
Okta Hardening Guide Updated to Secure Non-Human Identities
Rob Gil and Naveed Mirza and Brandon Iske · 2026-02-03 · via Okta Security RSS Feed

Okta is proud to announce the latest version (1.1) of the Okta Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG), which provides U.S. government agencies additional security hardening recommendations related to network security and non-human identities.

First published by Okta and the U.S. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) in March 2025, the Okta Identity as a Service (IDaaS) STIG provides instrumental hardening guidance for identity and security practitioners.

The new checks introduced in version 1.1 are critical for securing service accounts, integrations, users, automation, and AI agents. This updated guidance provides security mitigations in addition to protocols like DPoP and Cross App Access.

With the updated version of the STIG, we introduce five new checks. These checks are important in the efforts to protect NHI use cases as well as aligning with the latest version of the DoD Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (CC SRG). One update to the CC SRG is: 

Section 5.9.3.1

“…PaaS/SaaS offerings must ensure that exposing any allowlisted services does not enable all Mission Owner or tenants internet facing access by default. This can be accomplished through implementing internal firewall rules, proxies or other solutions that are compatible with the CSOs specific infrastructure and offerings.”

For commercial entities reading this, it essentially means don’t open your services to the internet by default. Our updated guidance provides the checks to help lock down access by IP, IP Range, or Geographic location. In addition to the network restrictions, we added a check to help block ‘anonymized proxies’, which are often a source of malicious traffic. 

The FedRAMP Program Management Office (PMO) requires Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) to provide “Recommended Secure Configuration” related to their service offerings. The Okta IDaaS STIG is Okta’s “Recommended Secure Configuration.” The benefit of doing a STIG is the additional independent validation and assessment provided by DISA. Our collaboration with DISA has been extremely valuable. We share the mission of helping our customers become as secure as possible. 

Commercial customers should take a risk-based approach to determine which STIGs to apply. We understand that commercial CSPs and vendors will often pursue maximum compatibility for customers, nevertheless these additional checks can be used for all privileged access (administrative and NHI) use cases. These are the kinds of checks that Okta leveraged to help prevent attacks, such as the recent Salesloft Drift and Gainsight attacks. These checks are specific to Okta’s offerings, but the same approach should be used for other service offerings. We hope these checks will serve you as well as they have served Okta. At the end of the day, this is a ‘least privilege’ issue. 

The Five Additional Checks

Okta API tokens must be configured with Network Zones to restrict authorization from known networks. API tokens are almost always privileged and sensitive. 

This check helps to verify that for all Okta-specific API tokens, an IP restriction is in place to help confirm that if a token is compromised, it cannot be used from an unapproved IP. Typically, a customer would configure this to be either VPN/SASE IP ranges, datacenter (cloud) ranges, or known office ranges. These should be configured to known and “owned” contiguous IP space. In the case of cloud, it should be a known contiguous IP range that is allocated only to your organization. Allowlisting the entire IP range of a public cloud service provider like AWS, Google or Azure would not be appropriate. 

Okta API tokens must be created under dedicated user accounts.

This is an Okta-specific check to help confirm that API tokens (NHI) are under a dedicated account that is not tied to an administrator. This aims to reduce privileges for NHIs and check if they are appropriate for their use cases. 

The Okta Global Session policy must be configured to allow or deny IP based access in accordance with the Access Control policy for Okta.

This check helps confirm that a Global Policy is defined for your users. In many companies, workforce users should only request resources from approved VPNs or SASE services (i.e. not from the general internet).  In the DoD use cases, this may be restricted to NIPRNet or other approved networks.

Okta must be configured with Network Zones defined to block anonymized proxies according to organizational defined policy.

Anonymized proxies are often a source of malicious traffic. Blocking this from the outset can help reduce probes as well as attack vectors. As a commercial customer, you may want to allow anonymized proxies for maximum reach and compatibility, but consider blocking them for privileged use cases. 

For each application integrated with Okta, network zones must be defined in its authentication policy.

This check helps to confirm that every application configured in an Okta organization takes IP restrictions into consideration. Does it really need to be accessible to any malicious actor on the internet? Customers should take a risk-based approach and work to verify that network restrictions are appropriate for the accessibility and use cases. The default is to allow internet access to the application; so, care should be taken to evaluate whether that is appropriate for the application.

Call to Action

We recommend customers assess their Okta organizations against the updated STIG. 

The Okta IDaaS STIG is available to download at https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/downloads/, search for Okta. If you have feedback on the STIG, please contact fedramp@okta.com.

Rob Gil is a Sr. Director, Federal Architecture at Okta and is responsible for leading the Public Sector technology initiatives for FedRAMP, DoD Impact Levels, and StateRAMP. Prior to Okta, Rob worked on the JEDI project for the DoD Cloud Computing Program Office as well as leading the Cloud SecOps team at Elastic. Rob’s work at Elastic helped set the foundations for the Elastic SIEM as an initial core contributor to the Elastic Common Schema and first version of the Elastic SIEM. Before Elastic, Rob led operations and engineering teams at Salesforce and a variety of financial institutions. When not working, Rob enjoys the quiet life on his homestead and dabbling with tech.

Naveed is a Senior Solutions Architect at Okta, focusing on the DoD and Federal customer base. He has worked in cybersecurity since leaving the US Navy in the late 1990s. Before coming to Okta, Naveed was a consultant for several DoD customers, and he continues to offer advice via active participation in the DoD community. He grew up in Stafford, Virginia, and upon returning from active duty, took up residence there once more. In his free time, he enjoys beer brewing, gaming, and the occasional date night with his wife.

Brandon Iske is a Principal Solutions Architect focused on enabling Federal Government and strategic accounts at Okta. He is passionate about strengthening our nation’s cybersecurity and user experience through Identity-focused IT modernization and cyber best practices. Before joining Okta, Brandon worked for over a decade in government public service to deliver and secure joint Department of Defense enterprise capabilities in endpoint security, mobile management, identity and access management, and Zero Trust architecture at the Defense Information Systems Agency. He earned a Bachelor’s Degree in Computer Science from the University of Nebraska at Omaha. He is also a National Science Foundation CyberCorps Scholarship for Service Alumnus and an Okta Certified Professional.