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The investigation found the Titan's carbon fibre hull became weaker over time, with damage building up after each deep-sea dive.
Its operator, OceanGate, never properly tested whether the vessel was strong enough for repeated trips to the Titanic wreck, and its construction did not follow standard engineering practices.
As a result, the company did not know how long the hull would remain safe and failed to spot or address the risks that ultimately led to the tragedy, which killed five people in June 2023.
OceanGate had developed systems intended to detect signs the frame was weakening, but they did not prevent the catastrophe, the report said.
One system collected data on the hull after each dive, but it was not consistently analysed and did not lead to the vessel being taken out of service.
Another was designed to warn the crew if the shell was close to breaking, allowing them time to surface. However, this 'had not been tested to demonstrate that it would consistently provide enough advance warning, and it did not function as intended during the occurrence', the report added.
Investigators concluded that these failures, alongside problems in the hull itself, ultimately caused the submersible to implode.
The Daily Mail has approached OceanGate for comment.
A shocking catalogue of errors doomed the Titan submersible and led to its implosion, a final safety report into the disaster has revealed
The investigation found the Titan's carbon fibre hull became weaker over time, with damage building up after each deep-sea dive Pictured: Salvaged pieces of Titan submersible arrive in St. Johns, Newfoundland
Pictured: Stockton Rush , Chief Executive Officer and Founder (2009) of OceanGate, who was killed in the explosion
The report found flaws during the vessel's construction, as well as damage caused during its operation, storage and transport, may also have contributed to its failure.
Investigators said OceanGate's internal decision-making and company culture meant key risks were not properly recognised or addressed before the fatal dive.
The investigation also highlighted wider concerns over the regulation of deep-sea submersibles, emergency response planning and industry safety standards, leading officials to issue six recommendations to help prevent a similar disaster.
The Titan imploded during a dive to the Titanic wreck on June 18, 2023, killing all five people on board in a catastrophe that sparked a worldwide search operation and intense scrutiny of the deep-sea tourism industry.
One hour and 45 minutes into the dive, the Titan lost contact with its support ship, the Polar Prince, and vanished.
For four long days the world held its breath until the US Coast Guard finally confirmed that all aboard had perished following a catastrophic implosion of the sub.
The victims included Stockton Rush, the captain and chief executive officer of OceanGate, the American company which owned the Titan.
There were three Britons on board as passengers – Hamish Harding, 58, Shahzada Dawood, 48, and his 19-year-old son, Suleman – and 77-year-old Frenchman, Paul-Henri Nargeolet. All died instantly.
Grieving wife and mother Christine Dawood revealed in April this year that the remains of Shahzada and Suleman were returned to their family as 'slush in two small boxes'.
Three years on from the tragedy, Mrs Dawood revealed the agonising wait to receive the remains of her loved ones.
'We didn’t get the bodies for nine months,' she told The Guardian. 'Well, when I say bodies, I mean the slush that was left. They came in two small boxes, like shoeboxes.'
Shahzada Dawood, left, and son Suleman
Christine Dawood lost her 19-year-old son Suleman and husband Shahzada in the June 2023 Titan submersible disaster
Pictured: The Titan submersible on its tender Oceangate Expeditions
The slush, as she calls it, is the remains that were recovered from the seabed, which were scrupulously separated and DNA tested by the US Coast Guard.
'There wasn’t much they could find,' she says. 'They have a big pile they can’t separate, all mixed DNA, and they asked if I wanted some of that, too. But I said no, just what you know is Suleman and Shahzada.'
In her kitchen, Mrs Dawood still displays the giant 9,090-piece Lego model of the Titanic built by her student son over two weeks.
'People are always a bit shocked to see it,' she says. 'But what was I going to do? Break it up? Hide it away? Suleman put all those hours in. He’d been fascinated with the Titanic since we went to a huge exhibition when we lived in Singapore.'
The Titan was neither officially registered nor certified. Key protocols were ignored before the fatal dive.
The vessel's fragile carbon fibre hull was controlled with nothing more sophisticated than the controller from a videogame console, meaning the Titan was little more than a 'death tube'.
Despite the vast risks being taken, OceanGate and the Titan reached the wreckage of the Titanic six times in 2021.
The following summer, Rush was back in the North Atlantic for a second season of dives.
Antonella Wilby, an expert in remotely operated underwater vehicles, joined Titan's support ship as a crew member midway through the season. She was horrified by her boss's gung-ho attitude.
'From the moment I stepped on to the ship, I never forgot it,' she says.
'I had to sign the liability waiver. Stockton was there and, to a room full of people, some of them who had paid him lots of money to be there, he says, 'The company's registered in the Bahamas and they don't do punitive damages, so don't even bother suing me.'
'That's a verbatim quote – I wrote it down right after this meeting because I was shocked.'
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