The deadliest terrorist attack in Australian history would not have been stopped by any law or power, an interim Royal Commission report has found.
The report, released by the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion on Thursday, found no intelligence or law‑enforcement agency identified any legal gap that prevented them from acting before the Bondi massacre on December 14.
Fifteen people - including a 10-year-old girl - were murdered and 40 others wounded when Naveed and Sajid Akram allegedly opened fire on families gathering for Chanukah by the Sea, a public Jewish celebration at Sydney's Bondi Beach.
The report confirmed Australia's Jewish community was 'the evident target' of the attack, which occurred despite the national terrorism threat level having been lifted to 'probable' more than a year earlier and warnings from a Jewish security group.
ASIO had repeatedly warned of a 'disturbing escalation' in antisemitic attacks following the Hamas terror assault on Israel in October 2023, with Jewish Australians increasingly targeted at homes, schools, synagogues and public events.
Yet the report said no agency has admitted it failed to act because of legal limitations, a finding likely to spark public anger and renewed scrutiny of security agencies.
More troubling still are unresolved questions about police protection at the Bondi event itself, after the Jewish community's own Community Security Group assessed the threat as high and warned that a terrorist attack was likely.
NSW Police support was limited to three general‑duties officers and one supervisor, who were not required to stay for the full event.
Naveed Akram, one of the alleged shooters, is seen at Bondi Beach on December 14
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese welcomed the Interim Report of the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion.
He said the government accepts all recommendations that fall within Commonwealth responsibility and is committed to working with states and territories on a national rollout of all 14 recommendations.
Albanese said his government was determined to strengthen Australia's counter‑terrorism arrangements in the wake of Bondi attack, even though the Commission found existing laws did not prevent authorities from acting.
'While Commissioner Bell found that Australia's legal and regulatory frameworks did not hinder agencies' ability to prevent or respond to the Bondi attack, this report makes clear there is more work to do to enhance our national counter‑terrorism capabilities,' Albanese said.
He noted the Commission did not identify any need for urgent or immediate legislative action, but said the recommendations were aimed at improving coordination, preparedness and long‑term resilience.
'The recommendations go to strengthening how we work together as a nation to prevent terrorism and respond to threats as they evolve,' he said.
Albanese confirmed the interim report includes a small number of classified recommendations that cannot be made public because of the risk of compromising sensitive national security information.
The government has also accepted those recommendations.
'Australians can be assured that these classified recommendations are being acted on swiftly,' Albanese said.
'They will be reflected in practical outcomes through new policy measures, targeted programs and appropriate funding decisions.'
Full list of 14 recommendations contained in the Bondi Royal Commission interim report
Recommendation 1
The procedures adopted by NSW Police in respect of Operation Jewish High Holy Days should apply to other high risk Jewish festivals and events, particularly those that have a public facing element.
Recommendation 2
Having regard to the significance of the role of the Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in providing counter-terrorism leadership, the Commission recommends consideration be given to making the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator's role full-time.
Recommendation 3
If the ANZCTC is to be used again as a crisis committee, the ANZCTC should be included in the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework so its role is clear.
Recommendation 4
The Counter-Terrorism Handbook should be updated promptly and then at least every three years in coordination with updates to the Counter-Terrorism Plan and the ANZCTC triennial review.
Recommendation 5
The ANZCTC should provide direct advice in the form of a written and/or oral briefing, at least annually, to National Cabinet (including, as appropriate, advice on ANZCTC activities, the use of the ANZCTC Special Fund, and national counter-terrorism challenges and priorities).
Recommendation 6
The ANZCTC should commission a review of the Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams, with a report to be submitted to Police Commissioners and the Director-General of Security within three months of commencement. The review should include consideration of leadership structures, team integration, systems access and information sharing arrangements. The review should place particular focus on the Joint Counter-Terrorism Team-NSW, elements of which should be for reporting specifically to the NSW Police Commissioner, the AFP Commissioner and the Director-General of Security.
Recommendation 7
The Australian Government should consider whether National Security Committee ministers, including the Prime Minister, should participate in a counter-terrorism exercise, along with all National Cabinet members, within nine months of each federal election.
Recommendations 8-12 - These recommendations are contained in the confidential interim report only
Recommendation 13
The Commonwealth and states and territories should prioritise efforts to finalise and implement an updated and nationally consistent National Firearms Agreement.
Recommendation 14
The Commonwealth, states and territories should prioritise efforts to implement the proposed National Gun Buyback Scheme.