From February to May 2026, Iran launched a sustained campaign of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones against U.S. forces across the Middle East. Iranian strikes hit 20 American forward operating bases and facilities in eight countries. They killed seven U.S. service members, wounded hundreds more, and destroyed at least 15 aircraft and multiple high-value missile defense radars. Pentagon officials estimate the damage at nearly $30 billion; internal assessments place the cost closer to $50 billion.

Even those numbers fail to capture the real loss.

The United States did not just lose equipment. It lost decades of forward military posture—airfields, logistics hubs, command nodes, and diplomatic access built over generations. When a base loses mission capability, the United States writes off every dollar invested in it, every year of labor, and every host-nation agreement that sustained it. Forward power projection depends on forward bases remaining operational. When those bases fail, deterrence fails with them.

Iran did not surprise the United States. Nor did Tehran defeat American forces through superior technology or resources. Instead, Iran exploited a structural failure inside the U.S. Joint Force—one senior leaders have documented, debated, and ignored for decades.

The United States did not lose these bases because Iran proved stronger. It lost them because capabilities and functions for defending them are fragmented between different owners.

Department of Defense policy assigns ground-based air and missile defense to the U.S. Army, a division of labor dating back to the Key West Agreement of 1948. At the same time, the U.S. Air Force Air Component Commander owns area air defense of bases themselves: the aircraft, personnel, fuel, equipment, and command infrastructure that make forward operations possible. This split creates a fatal incentive mismatch. The Army controls the defense mission but bears no operational consequence when an air base falls. The Air Force absorbs the losses but holds no authority over all capabilities and functions defending of its own bases.

That misalignment is not theoretical. In 2004 and 2005, the Army withdrew from its obligation to defend air bases under an existing joint service agreement, citing resource constraints. The Department of Defense took no corrective action. No one restored accountability. The Joint Force postponed the reckoning until 2026—when Iran collected the debt in full.

During the campaign, this failure played out in real time. Missile defense systems existed, but commanders failed to integrate them with air base operations. Passive defenses and active interceptors were not integrated. Radar coverage focused on high-altitude ballistic threats while low-altitude cruise missiles, drones, and even manned aircraft exploited the gaps. In one striking case, an Iranian fighter aircraft designed in the 1960s flew below radar coverage and bombed a U.S. base. That was not a fluke. It was the predictable outcome of doctrine that concentrated exquisite defenses on narrow threat sets while leaving cheaper, lower-altitude avenues exposed.

Iran also attacked the missile defense architecture itself. Iranian planners struck high-value radar systems early, blinding interceptors before they could engage. U.S. forces failed to relocate those sensors, failed to harden them adequately, and treated fixed emplacements as permanent rather than vulnerable. Years of combat observation from Ukraine had already exposed these vulnerabilities. U.S. forces ignored those lessons.

Worse still, the missile defense enterprise failed to learn during the fight. The system collected enormous amounts of real-world combat data but did not convert it into improved defensive performance. A defense enterprise that cannot adapt under fire does not defend anything. It simply absorbs punishment while waiting for the next strike. Doctrine did not cause this failure. On paper, roles and responsibilities remain clear.

Joint Force Commanders assign Air Component Commanders to plan and execute integrated air and missile defense. Army missile defense commands embed with Air Operations Centers to synchronize defenses. The Joint Force understands these relationships. What it lacks is an enforcement mechanism that compels institutions to execute the responsibilities they already claim.

Deterrence through strength requires more than capability. It requires accountability. When forward bases fall, deterrence collapses. When responsibility diffuses across bureaucratic seams, failure becomes inevitable.

The lesson of 2026 does not demand more interceptors or radars—though the force needs both. It demands structural reform. The Department of Defense must align authority, responsibility, capability, and consequence. Services must answer for the missions they own. Combatant commanders must possess enforceable control over integrated base defense. Missile defense cannot remain a bureaucratic orphan divided among institutions that do not share risk.

America’s adversaries have already mapped these seams. Iran exploited them deliberately and effectively. If the United States refuses to fix them now, the next conflict will not serve as a warning. It will establish a new playbook.

Access the full whitepaper here – https://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alerts/mdaa-alert-the-failure-of-the-joint-forces-roles-and-responsibilities-in-missile-defense/

About the writer:

Mr. Riki Ellison is the Founder and Chairman of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, a non-profit organization launched in 2002 with a singular purpose and mission to drive for the deployment, development, and evolution of missile defense. Since its founding, the organization has emerged as the expert voice on missile defense in the world.

Ellison has been in attendance of over 307 missile defense tests, 821 U.S. and Allied base visits, and has advocated for missile defense in all 50 states and 34 countries.