Paper 2026/759

A Scalable Fault Countermeasure for SLH-DSA: Trade-offs Between Memory, Performance, and Fault Resilience

Tobias Schneider, NXP (Austria)

Denise Verbakel, NXP (Netherlands)

Abstract

We introduce compressed caching, a scalable and parameterizable countermeasure against grafting tree fault attacks on SLH-DSA. Unlike standard caching, which entails fully caching the WOTS+ signatures and public keys, compressed caching achieves significant memory savings while maintaining strong fault detection capabilities. It can be tuned to achieve a trade-off between caching memory size, fault resilience, and performance, making it well-suited for deployment across devices with varying resource and security constraints. We provide a security and performance analysis of compressed caching and show that it can be configured to achieve high fault detection probability and outperform standard caching, mainly in terms of memory but also in terms of performance. Additionally, we explore granular variants of both standard and compressed caching and study on a finer scale the memory-performance trade-off of both standard and compressed caching. Our results demonstrate that compressed caching is especially advantageous for constrained devices, outperforming standard caching when less than approximately 256 kB of caching memory is available.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/759,
      author = {Melissa Azouaoui and Tobias Schneider and Denise Verbakel},
      title = {A Scalable Fault Countermeasure for {SLH}-{DSA}: Trade-offs Between Memory, Performance, and Fault Resilience},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/759},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/759}
}