Paper 2026/018

Multi-Instance Unrecoverability of iMHF-Based Password Hashing

Pooya Farshim, Durham University, UK, Input Output, Switzerland

Siamak F. Shahandashti, University of York, UK

Karl Southern, Durham University, UK

Abstract

The study of memory-hard functions (MHFs) has so far focused mainly on provable guarantees on the expected minimum cumulative memory complexity (CMC) required per \emph{evaluation} when amortized over multiple instances. Such results, however, say nothing about whether the passwords in a compromised password bank remain \emph{unrecoverable}. Indeed, a construction can be memory-hard while still leaking information about its input. We provide the first formal treatment of the unrecoverability of graph-based data-independent MHFs (iMHFs) in the multi-instance setting. Multi-instance security is the widely accepted security model when inputs have low entropy or are correlated, and requires the adversarial effort to scale linearly with the number of instances broken. To prove these results, we extend the ex-post-facto pebbling technique of Alwen and Serbinenko (STOC'15) and the unguessability reductions of Farshim and Tessaro (EUROCRYPT'21). We then combine the two resulting frameworks to bound the number of guesses of adversaries with a given \emph{maximum} CMC (over the random oracle and adversary coins) in terms of the pebbling complexity of the graph underlying the iMHF. Combined with known lower bounds on the pebbling complexity of Catena's underlying graph, we obtain concrete unrecoverability bounds for Catena, showing in particular that adversarial advantage diminishes exponentially with the number of instances recovered, with the per-instance advantage growing linearly in the maximum CMC of the adversary.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/018,
      author = {Charles Dodd and Pooya Farshim and Siamak F. Shahandashti and Karl Southern},
      title = {Multi-Instance Unrecoverability of {iMHF}-Based Password Hashing},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/018},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/018}
}