Paper 2026/251

OpenAC: Open Design for Transparent and Lightweight Anonymous Credentials

Hy Ngo, VNUHCM-University of Science

Vikas Rushi, Ethereum Foundation

Ying Tong, ideal

Moven Tsai, Ethereum Foundation

Janabel Xia, Harvard University

Abstract

Digital identity systems require mechanisms for verifiable, privacy-preserving presentations of user attestations. The trivial approach of utilizing selective disclosure by presenting individually signed attestations introduces persistent linkability that compromises user anonymity. Existing anonymous credential systems come with practical drawbacks. Some depend on trusted setups, others require substantial modifications to an issuer’s established issuance flow. We propose an open, transparent, and lightweight anonymous credential design that addresses these limitations with the use of zero-knowledge proofs. Our construction is modular, requires no trusted setup and integrates with existing workflows without the need for substantial changes to existing cryptographic mechanisms, procedure overhauls, or hardware devices. It delivers unlinkability while maintaining broad applicability across heterogeneous digital-identity ecosystems and current verifiable credential standards. To demonstrate practicality, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation and benchmarks on mobile devices. Our results show best-in-class proving times, with a focus on efficient client-side proving, an essential requirement for usability in digital identity wallets. OpenAC was purposely constructed to be compatible with the European Digital Identity Architecture and Reference Framework (EUDI ARF). In the appendix, we map EUDI ARF’s functional, privacy, and interoperability requirements, illustrating how OpenAC satisfies regulatory constraints while preserving strong user privacy.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/251,
      author = {Liam Eagen and Hy Ngo and Vikas Rushi and Ying Tong and Moven Tsai and Janabel Xia},
      title = {{OpenAC}: Open Design for Transparent and Lightweight Anonymous Credentials},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/251},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/251}
}