Paper 2026/1004

PQKryvos: Post-Quantum Secure E-Voting With Flexible Ballot Formats and Public Tally-Hiding

Pascal Reisert, University of Stuttgart

Ralf Kuesters, University of Stuttgart

Abstract

Fair and free elections are the foundation of democracies and democratic processes. They require voting protocols that guarantee the integrity and verifiability of the result, as well as the private choice of each voter. Currently deployed e-voting protocols rely on traditional hardness assumptions, like the discrete logarithm problem, to provide these security guarantees. They are not post-quantum secure (pq-secure). While first proposals for pq-secure protocols exist, they are limited in the variety of voting scenarios they can support and/or in terms of efficiency. In this work, we therefore propose PQKryvos, an efficient and flexible pq-secure homomorphic e-voting protocol that can be instantiated for a wide variety of election methods and ballot formats. Our construction efficiently combines homomorphic lattice-based commitments with hash-based general-purpose proofs (GPZKPs) to ensure ballot correctness. As a pq-secure instantiation of the Kryvos framework introduced by Huber et al. (CCS 2022), PQKryvos not only provides voter privacy and (public) verifiability of the result, but additionally allows for the stronger privacy notion of public tally-hiding. Public tally-hiding ensures that only the intended election result (such as the full vote count or only the winner) is publicly revealed, while no additional information is leaked. This further improves the privacy for both voters and election candidates. PQKryvos is the first homomorphic pq-secure e-voting protocol to generically support arbitrary ballot formats and the first to provide public tally-hiding. Our implementation and evaluation of PQKryvos demonstrate that it achieves practical performance for diverse election schemes and outperforms the original pre-quantum Kryvos instantiation in some settings. Moreover, we demonstrate that by utilizing GPZKPs, existing pq-secure e-voting protocols can support additional ballot formats, can be enhanced in their tallying phase, and can be extended to publicly tally-hiding protocols.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1004,
      author = {Nicolas Huber and Pascal Reisert and Ralf Kuesters},
      title = {{PQKryvos}: Post-Quantum Secure E-Voting With Flexible Ballot Formats and Public Tally-Hiding},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1004},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1004}
}