Paper 2026/158

Setup Protocols for Sender Anonymity

Jiatai Zhang, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Megumi Ando, Tufts University

Abstract

Anonymous communication is essential for secure and private interactions over public networks. Existing solutions that provide provable anonymity rely on the so-called simple I/O setting, where every participant sends and receives the same number of messages, masking their true communication pattern. The only known way to enforce this setting is through dialing protocols. Such protocols establish pairwise conversations, but each recipient inevitably learns who attempted to contact them, violating sender anonymity, the guaranty that even the recipient cannot determine who attempted to contact them. In this work, we introduce the notion of enhanced dialing protocols, a broad class of protocols that enforce the simple I/O setting. We also initiate the first formal study of such protocols with respect to sender anonymity. We introduce a framework that captures three key properties: security, correctness, and fairness. Within this framework, we present Fusion, a protocol that achieves perfect correctness and fairness while incurring only unavoidable leakage, and Fusion+, a differentially private variant that reduces this leakage at the cost of some correctness. Through theoretical analysis, we quantify the fundamental trade-off between privacy and correctness in Fusion+. Note: This is the full version of the paper that has been accepted to appear at IEEE CSF 2026.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/158,
      author = {Tian Huang and Jiatai Zhang and Megumi Ando},
      title = {Setup Protocols for Sender Anonymity},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/158},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/158}
}