Paper 2026/623

Bad Benchmarks and a Fourier-Analytic Framework for Characterizing the (Un)Hideability of Combinational-Logic Circuits

Kollin Labowski, University of Florida

Thomas Shrimpton, Galois (United States), University of Florida

Abstract

Design-hiding (DH) schemes, such as logic locking, aim to protect circuit-design intellectual property (IP) in the integrated-circuit (IC) supply chain. While many practical DH schemes have been proposed over the past 15 years, nearly all have been broken by efficient attacks. Security and efficiency claims for these schemes have been based primarily on evaluations using benchmark circuits from legacy test-suites such as ISCAS’85 and MCNC. Recent work suggests that some circuits are fundamentally unhideable, as their functionality can be approximately learned using classical blackbox (BB) learning-theoretic (LT) algorithms. In this work, we ask: How prevalent are unhideable circuits in standard DH benchmarks? To answer this, we identify properties—such as sparse Fourier spectra—that make circuits unhideable. However, since BB Fourier-analytic algorithms are often slow and inaccurate for large-domain circuits, we shift to a whitebox (WB) setting. We develop new, efficient WB variants of Fourier-analytic algorithms that leverage WB access to a circuit and advances in model counting to efficiently evaluate whether the circuit has properties that make it unhideable. Upon applying these algorithms to standard DH benchmarks, we find that most circuits in the ISCAS'85 and MCNC test-suites are fundamentally unhideable, whereas newer benchmarks exhibit stronger resistance to Fourier-analytic algorithms and merit broader use in DH evaluation.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/623,
      author = {Animesh Chhotaray and Kollin Labowski and Thomas Shrimpton},
      title = {Bad Benchmarks and a Fourier-Analytic Framework for Characterizing the (Un)Hideability of Combinational-Logic Circuits},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/623},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/623}
}