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End-to-end encryption (E2EE) provides strong confidentiality guarantees to users by preventing service providers from accessing their data. At the same time, it introduces new operational challenges, most notably the restoration of an E2EE-protected backup on a new device after loss of the original device. In recent years, major instant messengers have deployed increasingly sophisticated key-retrieval schemes for encrypted backups, ranging from simple recovery codes to designs that depend on trusted hardware or advanced cryptographic primitives such as oblivious pseudorandom functions (OPRFs), threshold OPRFs, and secret sharing. While recent work has largely emphasized stronger cryptographic guarantees, the practical costs and trust assumptions implied by hardware dependencies and complex primitives are often not made explicit. We present a structured framework for the comparative evaluation of E2EE backup key-retrieval schemes across usability, deployability, and security properties, and apply it to simple recovery codes, real-world deployments, and recent proposals from the literature, explicitly distinguishing recovery that depends on user-chosen low-entropy secrets from recovery using high-entropy material. Our evaluation shows that schemes whose recovery ultimately relies on user-chosen low-entropy secrets can provide substantially weaker resistance against large-scale adversaries than an approach using simple recovery codes. Even when assuming high-entropy recovery secrets, many recovery protocol designs introduce additional trust assumptions and potential single points of failure (e.g., compromise of specialized components or trusted setups) that can amplify the impact of large-scale adversaries. Overall, our results highlight that added system complexity often trades off against limited security gains under realistic threat models, motivating clearer accounting of cost and distribution of trust in future designs.
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1108,
author = {Dennis Funke and Kai Gellert},
title = {A Comparative Evaluation of End-to-End-Encrypted Key Retrieval in Backup Protocols},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1108},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1108}
}
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