Paper 2026/461

Compact HQC with new (un)balance

Lan Luo, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China

Haodong Jiang, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China

Jianhua Hou, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China

Tong Yu, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China

Hong Wang, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China

Kangquan Li, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China

Longjiang Qu, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China

Abstract

Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) is a leading code-based key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM), recently selected by NIST for standardization, whose bandwidth and efficiency are balanced with the concrete cost of information-set decoding (ISD) attacks. However, the current balance relies on (1) the decryption-failure-rate (DFR) is directly configured to be less than $2^{-\lambda}$ ($\lambda$ is the security parameter), rather than carefully determined by choosing conservative parameters to resist known attacks as the Kyber team did in the design of NIST FIPS 203; (2) the error distribution in the underlying quasi-cyclic syndrome decoding problem is restricted to be balanced. In this paper, we show how to quantitatively and conservatively evaluate the impact of removing the aforementioned two restrictions on the complexities of known attacks, and thus find a new balance among bandwidth, efficiency, and security for HQC. In detail, we first formalize the best-known decryption-failure attack against HQC, and derive an upper bound on the probability that an adversary triggers a decryption-failure event under realistic query and time limits, enabling an attack-aware upper bound on the secure DFR. Second, we quantify how the weight distribution of $(\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2, \mathbf{e})$ (the random low-weight polynomials used in encryption) affects the concrete cost of ISD attacks and DFR. This yields an \emph{unbalanced} weight strategy that strictly lowers the DFR without sacrificing the targeted bit security, leading to a new variant called \emph{Unbalanced HQC (UHQC)}. By combining these analyses, we provide optimized parameters for UHQC. Across all NIST security levels, UHQC reduces bandwidth by 10-12% and improves runtime by 6-8%.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/461,
      author = {Chaofeng Guan and Lan Luo and Haodong Jiang and Jianhua Hou and Tong Yu and Hong Wang and Kangquan Li and Longjiang Qu},
      title = {Compact {HQC} with new (un)balance},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/461},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/461}
}