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Emanuele Marsicano, ETH Zurich
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) is a fundamental primitive for secure computation and its round complexity has been well studied. The works of Gennaro et al. [STOC'01] and Fitzi et al. [TCC'06] settled the landscape in the perfect-security setting, showing that for the optimal corruption threshold $t<n/3$, the exact round complexity is three, and for the sub-optimal corruption threshold $t<n/4$ it is two rounds. Similarly, Patra et al. [CRYPTO'09] and Kumaresan et al. [ASIACRYPT'10] settled the landscape in the statistical setting, showing that for $t<n/2$ (resp. $t<n/3$), the exact round complexity is three (resp. two). Current protocols with optimal resilience incur three rounds even when the actual number of corruptions $f$ is sub-optimal. Fix corruption threshold parameters $0\le k \le t$. We ask whether it is possible to obtain a VSS protocol that incurs two rounds when $f\le k$, and three rounds when $k<f\le t$. We show matching feasibility and impossibility results demonstrating that this is possible if and only if $3t+k < n$ for perfect security, and $2t+k < n$ for statistical security.
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1000,
author = {Martin Hirt and Chen-Da Liu-Zhang and Emanuele Marsicano},
title = {Information-Theoretic Optimistic Verifiable Secret Sharing},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1000},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1000}
}
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