Paper 2025/1627

IND-CPA-D of Relaxed Functional Bootstrapping: A New Attack, A General Fix, and A Stronger Model

Yunhao Wang, Yale University

Ben Fisch, Yale University

Abstract

Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a powerful and widely used primitive in lots of real-world applications, with IND-CPA as its standard security guarantee. Recently, Li and Micciancio [Eurocrypt'21] introduced IND-CPA-D security, which strengthens the standard IND-CPA security by allowing the attacker to access a decryption oracle for honestly generated ciphertexts (generated via either an encryption oracle or an honest homomorphic circuit evaluation process). Recently, Cheon et al. [CCS'24] and Checri et al. [Crypto'24] have shown that even exact FHE schemes like FHEW/TFHE/BGV/BFV may still not be IND-CPA-D secure, by exploiting the bootstrapping failure. However, such existing attacks can be mitigated by setting negligible bootstrapping failure probability. On the other hand, Liu and Wang [Asiacrypt'24] proposed relaxed functional bootstrapping, which has orders of magnitude performance improvement and furthermore allows a free function evaluation during bootstrapping. These efficiency advantages make it a competitive choice in many applications but its ``relaxed'' nature also opens new directions of IND-CPA-D attack. In this work, we show that the underlying secret key could be recovered within 10 minutes against all existing relaxed functional bootstrapping constructions, and even within 1 minute for some of them. Moreover, our attack works even with a negligible bootstrapping failure probability, making it immune to existing mitigation methods. Additionally, we propose a general fix that mitigates all the existing modulus-switching-error-based attacks, including ours, in the IND-CPA-D model. This is achieved by constructing a new modulus switching procedure with essentially no overhead. Lastly, we show that IND-CPA-D may not be sufficient for some applications, even in the passive adversary model. Thus, we extend this model to IND-CPA-D with randomness (IND-CPA-DR).

Note: Fixed a typo in the abstract.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1627,
      author = {Zeyu Liu and Yunhao Wang and Ben Fisch},
      title = {{IND}-{CPA}-D of Relaxed Functional Bootstrapping: A New Attack, A General Fix, and A Stronger Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1627},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1627}
}