Paper 2025/985

Tighter Quantum Security for Fiat-Shamir-with-Aborts and Hash-and-Sign-with-Retry Signatures

, Sorbonne University, French National Centre for Scientific Research, Laboratoire de Recherche en Informatique de Paris 6

Serge Fehr, Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Leiden University

Yu-Hsuan Huang, Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica

Abstract

We revisit the quantum security (in the QROM) of digital signature schemes that follow the Fiat-Shamir-with-aborts (FSwA) or the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry/abort (HSwA) design paradigm. Important examples of such signature schemes are Dilithium, SeaSign, Falcon+ and UOV. In particular, we are interested in the UF-CMA-to-UF-NMA reduction for such schemes. We observe that previous such reductions have a reduction loss that is larger than what one would hope for, or require a more stringent notion of zero-knowledge than one would hope for. We resolve this matter here by means of a novel UF-CMA-to-UF-NMA reduction that applies to FSwA and HSwA signature schemes simultaneously, and that offers an improved reduction loss (without making the zero-knowledge assumption more stringent).

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/985,
      author = {Pouria Fallahpour and Serge Fehr and Yu-Hsuan Huang},
      title = {Tighter Quantum Security for Fiat-Shamir-with-Aborts and Hash-and-Sign-with-Retry Signatures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/985},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/985}
}