Paper 2026/867

On the (Privacy) Harms of the European Digital Identity Framework

Shannon Veitch, ETH Zurich

Mathilde Raynal, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

Theresa Stadler, Swiss Data Science Center

Sylvain Chatel, Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Wouter Lueks, Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Carmela Troncoso, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy

Abstract

As digital identity systems gain traction around the world, many see privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) as the key to ensuring safe deployment. We critically examine whether this is the case using the European Digital Identity Framework (EUDIF) as an example. We leverage techniques from cryptographic modeling to formally capture the necessary leakage of the functionality of the EUDIF and its proposed applications. Then, we develop a harm analysis methodology that illustrates, using harm trees, how this leakage — and other constraints stemming from design decisions or the context of deployment — lead to harms. Moreover, our harm modeling enables us to distinguish between which pathways to harm are inherent to the core functionality, and which pathways can be prevented with PETs. Our analysis shows that, while PETs can reduce information flows, they fall short in mitigating the harms that deploying digital identity can bring to individuals and society.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/867,
      author = {Christian Knabenhans and Shannon Veitch and Mathilde Raynal and Theresa Stadler and Sylvain Chatel and Wouter Lueks and Carmela Troncoso},
      title = {On the (Privacy) Harms of the European Digital Identity Framework},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/867},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/867}
}