Paper 2026/1121

Security Amplification via Robust Indistinguishability Combiners

Nir Bitansky, New York University

Nathan Geier, Tel Aviv University

Abstract

A robust combiner for a cryptographic primitive $P$ takes multiple candidate constructions of $P$ and produces a secure construction of $P$ provided that sufficiently many of the candidates are secure. A closely related notion is that of a security amplifier, where given a weakly secure construction of $P$, we aim to obtain a (strongly) secure one. Intuitively, one may expect that any robust combiner should act as an amplifier by thinking of "good randomness" as inducing secure instances, and of "bad randomness" as inducing insecure instances. Formalizing this intuition, however, has turned out to be challenging. Despite significant progress, general results remain limited and confined either to specific primitives or only to the statistical setting. We establish a new framework of robust indistinguishability combiners, which greatly extends the class of combiners covered by prior work, and prove that they inherently act as security amplifiers. Our results extend to the computational setting, provided that the combiner makes a single query to each candidate. The new framework allows us to rederive previously known amplification results in a simplified manner, as well as prove new amplification results that have so far been out of reach. As our main application, we present the first security amplifier for functional encryption, resolving an open question that first arose in constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation, and for which a gap was discovered in previous proofs. Our amplifier transforms a weak scheme with any constant indistinguishability error into one with full negligible security.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1121,
      author = {Benny Applebaum and Nir Bitansky and Nathan Geier},
      title = {Security Amplification via Robust Indistinguishability Combiners},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1121},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1121}
}