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Cryptology ePrint Archive

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Provable Security and Privacy Analysis of WPA3's SAE and ...
Shan Chen, Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzh · 2026-02-21 · via Cryptology ePrint Archive

Paper 2026/348

Provable Security and Privacy Analysis of WPA3's SAE and SAE-PK Protocols

Kaige Pan, Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen, China

Olga Sanina, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

Abstract

SAE and SAE-PK are the core security protocols introduced in the latest Wi-Fi security standard, WPA3, to protect personal networks. SAE-PK extends SAE to prevent the so-called evil twin attacks, where an attacker with the knowledge of the password attempts to impersonate a legitimate access point. In this work, we present the first provable security and privacy analysis of SAE and SAE-PK. We introduce formal models that capture their intended properties and use these models to analyze the guarantees these protocols provide. First, we identify an attack that prevents SAE from fulfilling its intended authentication guarantees. As a result, SAE can only be proven secure within a weaker security model, which we also formalize and show the proof in. To achieve the desired level of security, we propose two simple fixes, resulting in two efficient SAE protocols that we call SAEv2 and SAEv3. We prove that both protocols meet the intended security guarantees, with SAEv3 providing greater robustness. Next, we prove that SAE-PK is indeed secure against evil twin attacks, but its current design introduces a theoretical vulnerability to offline dictionary attacks, which contradicts the expected security guarantees of SAE-PK as an enhanced password-authenticated key exchange protocol. To remedy this, we show that SAE-PK can be modified with minimal changes to fully realize its desired security goals. Finally, we analyze the privacy guarantees of SAE, SAE-PK, and our proposed enhanced variants. We prove that their cryptographic core preserves the unlinkability of client devices across distinct Wi-Fi networks, if MAC address randomization is properly applied.

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/348,
      author = {Shan Chen and Kaige Pan and Olga Sanina},
      title = {Provable Security and Privacy Analysis of {WPA3}'s {SAE} and {SAE}-{PK} Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/348},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/348}
}