This paper formalizes the cryptographic core of the FLEX protocol and its enhanced variation FLEX2 . The analysis formalizes a minimal ledger abstraction, capturing Taproot, CSV timelocks, and reorg bounds, and defines ideal functionalities implemented as transaction-DAG and state machines. Main contributions include proving on-chain enforceability, CDS secrecy, soundness, leakage-bounded privacy, and universal composability realization under standard assumptions.
Note: Minor typos detected and amended
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/983,
author = {Ramses Fernandez},
title = {A formal analysis of {FLEX} and {FLEX2}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/983},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/983}
}
此内容由惯性聚合(RSS阅读器)自动聚合整理，仅供阅读参考。 原文来自 — 版权归原作者所有。