We have published a delivery body-neutral analysis setting out the functions, capabilities and delivery model needed for effective digital coordination, alongside a concept note proposing a sector-owned coordination entity.
As digitalisation and data initiatives across the energy sector gather pace, there is a growing imperative to ensure that activities are coordinated. Before deciding who should perform this coordination role, it is important to establish what the role needs to do and why.
To support this conversation, we have undertaken a delivery body-neutral analysis of a future digital coordination entity. Our analysis identifies the responsibilities, functions and capabilities required to deliver effective coordination with the findings underpinning our concept note, which sets out a proposed model for a sector-owned coordination entity.
Our aim is to support decision-makers by identifying the key considerations that should be addressed before decisions are made on institutional design and ownership. By focusing on the functions, capabilities and delivery model of a future coordination entity, this analysis is intended to inform sector deliberation, future public consultation, and the institutional arrangements needed to deliver effective digital coordination for the benefit of the climate, consumers and economic growth.
Emily Judson
Emily Judson, Head of Energy at Icebreaker One presented an analysis of the format, function and capabilities of a future digital coordination entity for the energy sector at our Open Energy Steering Group meeting.
Digitalisation is a broad and complex area of sector transformation. At present, large sector initiatives – such as the Data Sharing Infrastructure (DSI) and Consumer Consent Solution (CCS) – are driving significant change focused primarily on data and data sharing. The recent Digitalisation Vision also sets out new responsibilities for data domain coordinators, with NESO, RECCo and Elexon assigned new intended roles.
We suggest that this focus on data must be clearly reflected in the initial scope of the coordinator role, allowing effort and resources to focus on the area where coordination is most urgently needed.
Our analysis also highlights that clear rights, responsibilities and accountability, alongside stronger feedback loops between delivery, oversight and decision-making, must be established to support effective coordination.
The coordinating body would perform seven core functions as identified by DESNZ and Ofgem (Digitalisation Vision, 2026):
We recommend that the scope of these functions could be expanded to incorporate the following:
Our analysis identified three core capabilities required to empower an effective coordination entity:
Each capability above has the potential to create conflicts of interest depending on where it sits. Institutional design and governance are critical considerations and our analysis suggests that independence of the coordinator should be prioritised.
Following the research and analysis outlined above, we examined what possible delivery body formats could effectively serve the functions and capabilities required to underpin successful digital coordination for the energy sector.
From these options, we see the functions and capabilities of the coordination entity best delivered via an independent mission-locked non profit company. It would be limited by guarantee and run through joint Directorship, with voting seats for the core delivery bodies and further seats spanning representative areas of the wider sector. DESNZ and Ofgem would participate as observers, reflecting the coordinator’s role in facilitating coordination and delivery rather than setting strategic direction.
This approach offers several advantages:
Our analysis explored a range of delivery models, including coordination via: an existing Ofgem regulated organisation – either embedded in digital programme delivery or separate from this; an existing organisation with relevant expertise but not (currently) regulated by Ofgem; and a new purpose-built entity.
Each presents different strengths and trade-offs. Existing organisations could offer sector knowledge and established relationships, but may face actual or perceived conflicts of interest. This is particularly salient if they are actively involved in the delivery of sector data programmes and/or have prior interests related to other aspects of their market position. Assigning new enforcement powers to an organisation with an existing market position may add further complexity to its other role(s). A new organisation could provide greater independence and flexibility, but could take longer to establish and embed within the sector.
Rather than recommending a preferred delivery body, this analysis provides a framework for assessing these options against the capabilities required for successful coordination.
We welcome feedback as this discussion develops, to join the conversation, contact energy@ib1.org or sign up to Open Energy membership here
Please note that all outputs, including this report are © Icebreaker One Ltd.
The copyright of this content will be considered for release under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) open license based on the materiality of the outcomes at IB1’s sole discretion.
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