BUDAPEST, HUNGARY - APRIL 13: Peter Magyar, lead candidate of the Tisza party, speaks to the media the day after the sweeping Tisza victory over rival Fidesz in Hungarian parliamentary elections on April 13, 2026 in Budapest, Hungary. The win paves the way for Magyar to replace current Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who yesterday conceded defeat. (Photo by Sean Gallup/Getty Images)

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The defeat of Orban in Hungary’s elections opens a wide vista of geopolitical possibilities. Ukrainians in particular are delighted because it spells the end of Orban’s veto on EU financial and other help to them. When that help duly follows, then Ukraine’s resistance to Putin firms up, Europe’s weight in geopolitical clout rises, and the global power balance tilts on its axis. In effect, Orban’s loss is the beginning of the end of authoritarian populism around the world. So the argument goes.

That all rather depends on what aspect of the populist package you mean. (And, of course, what Orban does next). Peter Magyar, the new leader of Hungary, is no liberal. He will certainly start abiding by EU regulations and standards concerning governance, media freedoms, judicial independence and the like so his country gets the $21 billion of money the EU withheld from Orban. Roughly 10% of Hungary’s already ailing GDP. Thus, Magyar will move to end the corruption side of the pop-auth formula. But, make no mistake, he is still something of a nationalist. He was a member of Orban’s political party for many years before he couldn’t stomach the corruption any longer.

As a result, he’s not about to open the borders to immigrants or refugees in large numbers. Which possibly constitutes his most interesting challenge to the populist formula by absorbing its biggest political card - the protection of national identity. Recall that the influx of migrants to Europe and UK was consciously abetted and weaponized by Moscow and its allies to destabilize Europe’s governing elites at home. Magyar’s formula will show the way to defang the pro-Putin populist parties of European countries if the latter have the good sense to emulate his synthesis of policies.

Then there’s the question of what Orban does next. He could flee to Moscow. Plenty of precedent for that, as in Ukraine’s Yanukovich after the Maidan massacres. But Orban has not massacred anybody and he did concede lawfully when the time came. Ironically, the new constitution he created worked against him because it multiplies parliamentary numbers of the a significant win party and minimizes those of the loser. Nevertheless, over the 16 years of his self-dealing leadership he has packed the bureaucracy and economy with his supporters. Hungary now faces the prospect of a contentious and divisive purgation of his minions at all levels of society.

Orban must know that legal proceedings against his long years of alleged corruption will follow. And his adherents know full well that any prosecution launched against his conduct in office will ultimately target the beneficiaries of his patronage. From the judiciary to the media to the intelligence services, they will resist and obstruct. Draining the swamp, for Peter Magyar, Hungary’s new leader, will not be an easy task.

This struggle against institutionally entrenched resistance is hardly a new story in the region. We saw it played out repeatedly in Eastern Bloc countries as Soviet power faded. Rumania could do nothing but wait a couple of decades for its Caucescu-era elites to retire after the dictator’s fall. Conversely, in Georgia, the pro-western leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, literally fired 15,000 policemen overnight to end their bribe-taking habits.

But he paid a high-price for his speedy approach to reforms. The displaced elites, backed by the country’s richest oligarch, by Russian money, dark ops and threats of war, beat Saakashvili electorally in 2012. His pro-Moscow rivals dug in and created the first post-liberal state as such regimes are sometimes called. They still run the country and have kept him in prison since he returned to fight for democracy on October 2021. Georgians have demonstrated in massive numbers almost daily for over 400 days since the regime’s dubious victory in the last election. Magyar’s counter-victory in Hungary will only embolden them.

Both Orban and Magyar doubtless know the regional scenarios well, along with the implied stakes. Orban can make Hungary’s revival so grinding that Magyar’s tenure will be associated with grim struggles and anxiety - amplified by a constant Tiktok barrage of negative disinformation spread online from Moscow. For every attempt to displace an Orban media baron or oligarch, one can expect saturating disinformation and invocations of state bullying, Magyar cronyism or threats to Hungarian autonomy from the EU. Dark ops, sex tapes, hacking attacks on state bodies, leaked confidential or high-security calls. As happened before the election, relentless sinister adversities will batter Magyar’s team.

If you don’t think such campaigns can obliterate the memory of Orban’s long misrule, consider how often post-Soviet countries have been persuaded to re-embrace the Kremlin line a couple of decades after being joyously liberated from it.

In Georgia, Saakashvili’s tenure of free-enterprise, open media, and liberal democracy was successfully smeared with just such dark ops. It was the first of such dominoes to fall with Moscow’s help in its favor. It has taken this long for the West to catch up with recognizing and pitching in against the post-liberal network. The horrendous conduct of Russia in Ukraine has served to awaken Europe in this regard.

Having substantial spoiler threats in hand, not least supplied by Moscow, Orban is certain to propose deals where he and his circle avoid justice in exchange for giving Magyar an easier time. This too has precedent. Recall that Putin made a deal with his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, in exactly this way. Ukraine’s oligarchs, now mostly gone, enjoyed similar immunity for keeping their parliamentarians on side. None of which Magyar can begin to emulate, having promised to restore the rule of law, which in some ways adds to his adversities and ties his hands in the short-term.

In Orban’s case, his adherents need him to stay and fight for their protection. Magyar promised to reduce term limits to two terms, which effectively blocks Orban in the next election. He will likely move backstage and run his party through a front-man as Georgia’s Ivanishvili has done. Either way, tough years of negotiated progress lie ahead. Hungary alone cannot overcome Orban’s institutional weapons of obstruction especially if pro-Putin regimes conspire with him. Sustained help from European allies to will be essential in ways they failed, too often, to do in the past.