JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA - MARCH 11: (——EDITORIAL USE ONLY - MANDATORY CREDIT - 'UKRAINIAN PRESIDENCY / HANDOUT' - NO MARKETING NO ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS - DISTRIBUTED AS A SERVICE TO CLIENTS——) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (L) meets with Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (R) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on March 11, 2025. (Photo by Ukrainian Presidency / Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Anadolu via Getty Images

The US’s war with Iran should have given Russia a bigger edge vis-à-vis Ukraine. Due to the energy supply shock caused by Iran’s blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, US President Donald Trump provided temporary sanction relief to Russia’s oil industry, helping Moscow receive an additional $9-10 billion in revenues per month.

While Russia amasses more revenues to fund its conflict with Ukraine, the US is increasingly distracted and quickly depleting its missile reserves. In its war with Iran, the US has already used up between 50%-80% of its high-altitude defense systems (THAAD) stockpile, and is also now running low on Tomahawk missiles, surface to surface missiles and air defense interceptor missiles.

The depletion of US’s Tomahawk missile arsenal should have been especially concerning for Ukraine. The Pentagon had approved sending Tomahawk missiles (which are highly effective and precise long-range missiles that can hit targets 1,000 miles away) to Ukraine in late 2025 pending Trump’s approval. Now this shipment is even less likely to happen. Costing over $2 million each, the US has burned through over 1,000 Tomahawk missiles in its war with Iran (or 30% of its inventory). To build more would require samarium-cobalt magnets, 99% of which is mined in China, thus requiring China’s permission.

On top of that, tensions between the US and European NATO allies are more heightened than ever, all of which should bode well for Russia. And yet although the Strait of Hormuz crisis has delivered clear economic benefits to Moscow, Ukraine has proven more effective at leveraging the situation to its strategic advantage.

Russia’s failures and vulnerabilities

Russia’s performance in the war in Ukraine continues to be undermined by significant operational weaknesses; economic gains have not translated into battlefield success. Its poor performance has led to 1.2 million casualties including 325,000 killed, with 35,000 casualties a month. This is more losses than any major power in any war since World War II. Russia tried to accelerate its offensive in 2024, but Russian forces are only advancing at an average rate of 15-70 meters per day, slower than any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century.

To address its dwindling troop numbers, Russia has relied on troops from North Korea, and more recently recruited troops from African countries such as Ghana, South Africa and Kenya with promises to pay conscripts to fight on the front lines $4000 a month. African troops have received minimal training and are deployed to high-risk roles, facing racism, abuse, and language barriers with little evidence that this has improved Russia’s combat effectiveness. Moscow’s reliance on African soldiers is another sign that the war in Ukraine is not going well.

Russia has tried to adapt to its huge losses in troops by using drones. After being completely dependent on Iranian made Shahed-drones, Russia learned to produce its own drones, with reports that it produces between 4,000 and 5,000 drones a month. Russia launched 6,583 drones at Ukraine just in the month of April.

But while drones have helped mitigate its troop losses, the Iran war has shed light on new vulnerabilities for Russia, which Ukraine has increasingly exploited. Undoubtedly, the Iran war has demonstrated that attacking energy infrastructure imposes huge costs, not just on targets in the Gulf states but on Russia as well. Long-range Ukrainian made drones have pounded Russian oil export infrastructure on the Baltic Sea Coast, more than six hundred miles away from Ukraine. On May 4th, Ukrainian drones hit Russian energy infrastructure including its shadow fleet of oil tankers. These strikes have decreased Russia’s oil shipping capacity by 40%.

And Ukraine has also adapted to the fierce competition for advanced missile defence systems. In early March, the Gulf states were using Patriot missile defense systems to defend against Iranian ballistic missiles and drones, creating concerns that this would squeeze the Ukrainian missile defence arsenal and create competition between the Gulf states and Ukraine for Patriots, the backbone of Ukraine’s defense against Russian ballistic missiles such as the Iskander and the Kinzhal.

But Ukraine turned this quandary into an opportunity. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky travelled to the Middle East in mid-March to confirm security agreements with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. With these agreements, Ukraine will provide the Gulf states with much needed air-defence interceptor drones that cost $1000 each in exchange for Patriot Missiles which cost $3.7 million apiece.

As Ukraine drone manufacturers are only operating at 60% capacity and have room to manufacture 7 million drones in 2026, Kiev has been able to take advantage of a new market for its technology. Beyond its sales to countries in the Middle East, countries in Europe and the Caucasus are also seeking to acquire Ukrainian drone technology.