The spiralling cost of the U.S. Navy MQ-4C Triton shows how drone acquisition can go wrong.

U.S. Navy

The Pentagon just announced plans to up spending on uncrewed systems by a staggering 24,000%. They aim to boost funding on the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG) from $225.9 million in fiscal 2026 to a hefty $54.6 billion in fiscal 2026.

What is amazing here is not just the sheer volume of cash–around twice as much as the Air Force spent on new aircraft last year–but the acceleration. The Department of War is going from spending trivial amounts to a mountain on money in a (to them) unknown field. The LA Times calls it “the largest single military funding surge ever.”

Is this another Pentagon money pit? Or the only way to ensure that the U.S. will outpace drone superpowers like China?

Big Plans For Small Planes

The plans were revealed in a briefing for reporters on the FY 2027 budget request on April 21^stby Jules “Jay” Hurst III, acting undersecretary of defense, and Space Force Lt. Gen. Steven Whitney.

Hurst described DAWG as “a pathfinder,” to achieve drone dominance. The emphasis will be on evaluating, modifying and purchasing existing drone systems rather than developing new ones.

Whitney said that the money will be spent on a wide range of “new capabilities” which could be rapidly evolved fashion.

“It’s not that you’re buying one set baseline and you’re going to procure it forever,” said Whitney, adding that the R&D nature of the funding meant they were unlikely to buy “a lot of one particular thing.”

But there will also be investment in groundbreaking technological advances. DAWG attracted attention in January with a $100-million prize challenge to develop voice-control for drone swarms so a single operator can control many drones at once. DAWG call this “orchestrator technology” allowing a commander to issues orders to a drone swarm in exactly the same way as they would with human subordinates.

However, it sounds like much of the money will go on variants on existing drones. That will be music to the ears of the current major drone makers, and may ring bells for those who have been following U.S. drone procurement.

How Super Cheap Gets Super Expensive

$500 FPV drones have become some of the most effective weapons in the Ukraine. But in the U.S. drones cost more. Much more.

There are several factors at work here. The low-cost drones in Ukraine are derived from industrial mass production, whereas Pentagon drones are bespoke, custom-built in boutique quantities, and usually to the highest possible specification. So while Ukraine uses commercial “Mavic” consumer drones for reconnaissance, the U.S. military pays around $120k for their tactical quadcopters.

Creeping specifications push prices up. The original, MQ-1 Predator was designed in the 1990s as an expendable asset which could be sent into dangerous places. It gradually morphed into the larger and more capable MQ-9 Reaper costing $20m+ which cannot be risked so freely, nor fielded in large numbers.

Sometimes cost escalation just happens. The MQ-4C Triton was envisaged as a low-cost system to make up numbers and supplement the Navy’s $160m P-8 Poseidon ocean surveillance aircraft. But gradual cost growth meant the Navy ended up paying $400m each for its fleet of 27 Tritons over the total program.

DAWG has absorbed the previous Replicator program, a Pentagon effort to copy Ukraine’s production of millions of low-cost drones at speed. The result has not been encouraging. Rather than masses of $500 FPVs, Replicators’ most conspicuous achievement has been the acquisition of more of the existing SwitchBlade 600 drones. Like FPVs, these carry anti-tank warheads and are useful against a variety of targets. They are high quality but cost around $170k each. Again, this means only limited numbers can be fielded, not several for every enemy soldier.

There are plenty more examples. And while the Pentagon may have the best of intentions, those mountains of money will attract plenty of contractors with plausible arguments and PowerPoint decks, scenting opportunities in a sector where the gross profit margin is 18% or more.

Drone Dominance And Russia’s Toilet Man

The plan is for DAWG for to form the nucleus of a new Uncrewed Systems Combat Command, like Space Command (2019) and Cyber Command (2017).

If successful it will emulate Ukraine’s legendary equivalent, led by the charismatic Robert “Magyar” Brovdi. A bearded warrior-wizard figure, Brovdi started as a volunteer platoon commander with little knowledge of drones or warfare. But he quicky recognized the potential of small quadcopters and used his business skills to run his unit as a tech startup specializing in attack drones, designing and building much of their own equipment. “Birds of Magyar” grew rapidly from platoon to company to brigade, carefully recoding and tabulating every kill, learning and applying best practices and outpacing all rivals.

In June 2025, Brovdi was appointed Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF). As well as smaller targets his unit now hits Russian oil refineries with an ever-expanding arsenal of long-range drones. Recently the kill rate has accelerated to the point where Russians are being killed or injured faster than replacements can be recruited.

But there is a counter-example, Russia’s USF, is led by Yuri Vaganov, nicknamed “Toilet” by Russian commentators for his background in selling plumbing fixtures. Vaganov has applied his business skills to drone warfare, and his skills seem to revolve around corruption.

Vaganov has no formal military education or service, but apparently got the job on the basis of being the effective monopoly supplier of FPV drones to the Russian military. The VT-40 drones produced by Vaganov’s associates Sudoplatov are described as “utterly substandard” by Russian war blogger Vladimir Romanov. They have a high failure rate and many simply fail to take off. Those that do are highly vulnerable to jamming. But a cozy relationship with the Ministry of Defense keeps competitors locked out.

When the Russian military started buying FPVs, superior industrial capacity and buying power briefly gave them a lead. Now Russian soldiers complain that Ukraine not only has higher quality drones, it is fielding them in larger numbers. A recent ISW report suggests that Ukraine has a decisive drone advantage.

Russia is reportedly planning to ban other units from acquiring drones, so they are controlled exclusively by Vaganov’s USF. Only units which play ball will get drones, creating like an opportunity for more lucrative corruption. It is hard to see Russia regaining a lead in drones under this setup, however much money is spent.

DAWG is a bold effort to build a new drone-based force from scratch. But it is not enough to acquire drone hardware; the doctrine and organization to use them are also essential, along with a willingness like Ukraine to undertake a continuous learning process.

$55 billion could buy an extremely effective drone force. Or it could be money flushed down the pan. The budget plan has not yet been approved, but if it is, DAWG will need vigilant watchdogs to ensure the money is spent wisely.