Image captured from a video posted on Telegram by the Russian Ministry of Defense on November 27, 2025. The video shows Russian soldiers assembling a drone to spot targets on the west bank of the Oskil River.
Social Media Capture
A major goal of the current Russian offensive is to capture the Ukrainian city of Kupyansk, a key logistics hub in the eastern Kharkiv region. Russia’s ongoing attempts to take the city have been consistently blocked by a staunch Ukrainian defense anchored on the Oskil River. In particular, Russian forces have been unable to move soldiers and equipment across the Oskil in sufficient quantities to launch a successful assault on the city. Throughout the war, Russia has struggled with river crossings, which are widely considered among the most difficult military operations. As with other challenges in the war, Russia has attempted to employ advanced technologies, especially drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems, to support its crossing efforts, but these technologies do not appear to have had a meaningful impact.
Kupyansk’s importance lies in its role as a logistics and transportation hub, sitting on key supply routes, including rail lines and roadways. Control of the city would also open corridors for Russian forces to maneuver along the Oskil River line and into the broader Kharkiv–Luhansk axis, pushing their lines forward. Russian officials and military bloggers have repeatedly claimed that Russian forces have taken full control of Kupyansk, but these assertions have been largely contradicted by open-source intelligence indicating that Ukrainian forces still hold large portions of the city. Nonetheless, there are isolated pockets of Russian positions in and around Kupyansk, including a squad-sized element occupying a deserted hospital building.
Russia’s inability to take Kupyansk stems from its inability to move sufficient numbers of soldiers and armored vehicles across the Oskil River to support a large-scale assault. Russian forces initially crossed the river during the 2022 invasion but were pushed back to the eastern bank later that year. Since then, most crossing attempts have originated from Russian-controlled areas north of Kupyansk, where the river is narrow enough to support bridging operations. In early 2025, Russian units established small footholds on the western bank using boats and other improvised methods, including infiltration through unconventional routes such as pipelines. However, these footholds proved short-lived, as they could not be reinforced or resupplied.
Igor, a Ukrainian military member of the 114 Brigade stands on a destroyed railway bridge over the Oskil River during a scouting mission near the frontline in Kupiansk, Kharkiv region, on December 15, 2024. (Photo by Roman PILIPEY / AFP) (Photo by ROMAN PILIPEY/AFP via Getty Images)
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Ukrainian forces continuously patrol the river with drones and helicopters, monitoring for Russian crossing attempts. While small units may occasionally cross undetected, large-scale operations requiring bridging assets are difficult to conceal. Once detected, Ukrainian forces rapidly target and destroy both bridging equipment and crossing units, as seen in multiple failed Russian crossing attempts in late 2025, where drone strikes destroyed numerous vehicles and halted advances.
Given the central role drones play in their operations, Russian forces have employed them extensively in their attempts to cross the Oskil River. The Russian Ministry of Defense highlighted their use in a video posted to its Telegram account on November 27, 2025, showing soldiers assembling and launching a reconnaissance drone along the river. The drone subsequently identifies Ukrainian positions on the far side of the Oskil River, which are then targeted by artillery. In other videos posted on Telegram, Russian Molniya-2 strike drones are used to disrupt defensive positions and Ukrainian attempts to cross the river as part of counterattacks. More broadly, these drone and artillery strikes are used to set the conditions for Russian crossing operations, as Ukrainian positions are targeted and suppressed to enable Russian forces to cross the river and establish footholds.
Image captures from a drone footage on social media recorded by the Ukrainian 412th UAV Regiment "Nemesis." The videos show several Russian assault bridges being destroyed on the Oskil River near Dvorichna, Kharkiv Oblast.
Social Media capture
However, Ukrainian defenses are difficult to target with drones since they are widely dispersed across the battlespace. Some units operate close to the river, while others are positioned deeper in the defense. Additionally, the defense incorporates a range of systems, including artillery, manned strongpoints, strike drones, helicopters, and armored vehicles, all of which are staged in different locations. This dispersion and variety make them difficult to locate and disrupt, ensuring that even if some elements are suppressed, others remain active.
Furthermore, Ukrainian counter-drone defenses are extensive and constantly evolving. Ukrainian forces employ a layered defense network that includes extensive EW systems that disrupt Russian drone signals. Meanwhile, counter-drone teams move throughout the region, targeting and shooting down Russian drones. Individual soldiers also carry shotguns and specialized counter-drone ammunition. This layered approach has generally been successful in limiting the effectiveness of Russian drones in supporting bridging operations.
The primary threat to Russian crossings has been Ukrainian drones. As such, Russia has deployed advanced EW systems to create localized zones in which Ukrainian drones cannot operate effectively, thereby providing a measure of protection for forces preparing to cross the river. Russian forces reportedly used this approach in late March 2026 by deploying Pole-21 and R-330Zh Zhitel EW systems to create a jamming “umbrella” over an effort to construct a pontoon bridge across the Oskil River to support the crossing of a battalion tactical group.
However, these systems did not result in successful crossings, particularly given the depth of Ukrainian defenses. Even without drones, reconnaissance teams can detect staging for a potential crossing and then target the site using artillery or drones that are immune to jamming. In the March 2026 attempt, Ukrainian intelligence identified the Russian buildup and struck the site using fiber-optic guided drones, which are not affected by EW interference.
Image captured from a video posted on social media showing footage from a Ukrainian helicopter destroying a Russian raft attempting to cross the Oskil River.
Social Media Capture
More broadly, EW cannot fully eliminate the modern drone threat. EW systems primarily disrupt or block the signals received by drones, rather than preventing their transmissions. When jammed, many modern drones switch to a failsafe mode that allows them to continue flying and transmitting video feeds back to the operator, though with limited control. Additionally, Ukraine fields fiber-optic drones that are immune to EW jamming. The activation of EW systems is also often observable in the electromagnetic spectrum, effectively signaling to Ukrainian forces that activity is occurring in a specific area. This can indicate impending operations, including crossing attempts, allowing Ukrainian units to target those locations and undermining the intended effect of EW systems.
Russia is unlikely to abandon its efforts to take Kupyansk, and it must cross the Oskil River to do so. As such, it will likely continue experimenting with new technologies and tactics, including improved drone and EW systems, more resilient bridging techniques, and alternative methods of crossing. It may also seek to better coordinate intelligence, fires, and maneuver to concentrate combat power and cover a crossing attempt.
Regardless, the fundamental challenge remains unchanged. River crossings require mass, logistics, and time, all of which are increasingly difficult to achieve under conditions of persistent surveillance and precision strike. Any attempt to build combat power at the river’s edge creates a target, and the longer that target remains in place, the more vulnerable it becomes. Successful crossings must be executed quickly, which requires a substantial level of training that many Russian units lack.
Meanwhile, Ukraine has had time to prepare and refine its defenses along the Oskil River. Its integration of drones, artillery, and reconnaissance has created a layered defensive system that is well suited to disrupt any Russian crossing attempts. As such, even with advanced technologies, Russia is unlikely to overcome the enduring challenges of crossing the Oskil River.
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