Murky Outlook For The Strait of Hormuz

Once an interim peace agreement is reached and the Strait of Hormuz reopens to commercial shipping, there are several challenges that will have to be addressed before the strait can return to something akin to normal operations.

First, industry and maritime experts anticipate that it will take at least a few weeks to clear the existing backlog of hundreds of commercial tankers and cargo ships laden with oil, natural gas and fertilizers. There are already reports that several commercial ships have moved closer to the strait in anticipation of an opening. Simply organizing an orderly departure timeline and route for this many vessels will require significant logistical coordination.

At the same time, shipping firms will still presumably have to reach an accommodation with their insurers before resuming passage through the strait. While this may be done in short order, it might also require a broader effort to organize a multinational naval escort operation and identify a country or coalition of countries to lead it.

And then there is the issue of sea mines. Before strait traffic resumes on a large scale, minesweeping will likely be necessary: IRGC mines have reportedly been placed in the straight during the conflict, some as recently as last weekend. This operation is likely to take longer than expected given that some of Iran’s floating, moored, or poorly deployed mines might have been moved by shifting currents. It’s possible that even Tehran might not know where to find these mines and their threat to shipping lanes.

It’s also worth remembering that tensions are likely to be quite high in the initial aftermath of a peace deal, so even an occasional exchange of fire by ill-disciplined or isolated units near the strait, especially involving Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, could spook commercial shippers and delay the effort to resume transit.

As of now, experts believe that shipping through the strait will likely return to 30-50% of pre-war volume within several weeks of an initial US-Iran peace agreement. However, returning to pre-war shipping through the strait is likely to take as long as a few years, largely owing to the significant damage done to regional oil facilities during the war.

Iran’s Proxies An Enduring Threat

Iran’s proxy network has been significantly weakened in recent months but retains the ability to strike targets throughout the region. The two proxies of most concern going forward are, in my view, the Iranian-backed Shia militia groups in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

In Iraq, Shia armed groups aligned and supported by Iran—many with ties to the Iraqi government through participation in the Popular Mobilization Forces, a legally recognized arm of Iraq’s security apparatus—have conducted several hundred drone and rocket attacks. They have repeatedly targeted US military and diplomatic facilities in Iraq and elsewhere, as well as a civilian infrastructure targets, including critical Gulf energy nodes. These groups reportedly possess conventional military, drone and rocket capabilities, and have built their technical expertise over several years with Iran’s assistance.

These militias are likely to remain a source of regional irritation as they keep trying to erode Baghdad’s territorial control, drive the US out of Iraq and threaten selected energy targets in the Gulf, all while affording Iran a degree of deniability for their actions.

Meanwhile in Yemen, the Houthis have long received weapons, training and intelligence support from Iran, and experts note that Iran’s support has enabled the Houthis to effectively fight in Yemen’s civil conflict and project power into the Red Sea and Bab-al-Mandeb Strait—the sole entry point to the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean and a vital energy-supply choke point for Asia, Europe and North America.

While the Houthis have remained largely on the sidelines in this latest round of fighting, with the Saudis reportedly playing a key restraining role, there is no doubt that if Tehran requests that the Houthis target shipping in the Red Sea to ease future US and Israeli military pressure on Iran the Houthis have the capacity and willingness to do so.

Iran’s Weapons Remain A Top Concern

Available information indicates that in the absence of sustained military pressure Iran will be able to quickly rebuild its drone and missile inventory. According to media reports, US officials believe that during the six-week ceasefire Iran has already exceeded all timelines for reconstituting its weapons arsenal, and can potentially reconstitute its pre-war drone capabilities in only a few months.

Meanwhile, news reports citing US and Israeli sources indicate that Iran has already resumed its missile manufacturing efforts using surviving components, underground facilities and partially damaged missile production facilities, aided by foreign assistance, especially from Russia. There are also reports that many of Iran’s missile launchers were not as badly damaged as first suspected in the coalition air campaign, though many are reportedly buried under rubble. I would expect Tehran to prioritize restoring its launchers and missile inventory in the immediate aftermath of the peace deal.

On the nuclear front, negotiations on the final disposition of Iran’s stockpile of 441 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and roughly 184 kilograms of lower grade uranium are likely to take several months to resolve. But it’s worth remembering that even apart from the HEU issue Iran is likely to enjoy a post-conflict infusion of money (mainly from sanctions relief, the ability to resume oil exports and potentially even funding from its influence over the strait) to potentially fund nuclear research efforts.

In addition, Iran already enjoys a wellspring of nuclear expertise and knowledge of all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, as well as the ability to tap foreign partners for nuclear assistance (especially North Korea and Russia) if it so desires. So even after this conflict concludes there will almost certainly still be deep-seated regional fears about Iran’s potential nuclear capabilities and intentions.

Israel To Keep Pressing Its Case

Finally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has from the beginning of the conflict expressed expansive war aims, including regime change in Tehran, and he has made clear that Israel that would balk at any agreement that does not ultimately resolve Iran’s nuclear program or that seeks to constrain Israeli military actions in Lebanon. While I believe that Netanyahu is unlikely to publicly challenge President Trump on the terms of an eventual deal, there are reports that Israel’s leadership is worried that a final settlement could fall far short of what Israel believes is a satisfactory outcome to the war.

On Iranian weapons, I expect Israel to work aggressively in the time between the first phase of the agreement and the final accord to shape the White House’s negotiating stance, especially by lobbying for tough, intrusive and verifiable arms control restrictions on Iran. I would also expect Israel to continue its long-running shadow war with Iran even after the final settlement is achieved, periodically taking intelligence and military actions to setback Iran’s weapons development efforts when they appear to be moving forward. This will, of course, raise concerns about the durability of the peace accord.

In Lebanon, meanwhile, Netanyahu has made clear that he intends to continue attacking Hezbollah targets and reaffirmed last weekend that President Trump had assured him that Israel would retain freedom of action against military threats, “on every front, including Lebanon.” Iran prefers that the situation in Lebanon be included in a comprehensive peace settlement with the US, but that is a non-starter for Israel as it appears determined to dramatically weaken Hezbollah everywhere in the country and carve out an enhanced buffer zone for Israel in southern Lebanon.

The Likely Outcome: A Region That Remains On Edge

These are a few of the most important enduring security challenges, though there are others including: deep concern among Gulf States about their future security posture and Iran’s ability to threaten them; the ability of Gulf states to eventually reroute oil pipelines to reduce the strategic importance of the strait; Europe’s role in offering convoy protection once a settlement is achieved and shipping resumes; and China’s potential long-term interest in playing an enhanced security and reconstruction role in the Gulf.

In the end, then, despite the justified sense of relief that a US-Iran peace agreement will bring to virtually every corner of the globe, I would urge caution in assuming that many of the region’s most pressing security threats are resolved. In my view, Iran is likely to emerge from this conflict battered but emboldened, having survived a withering US and Israeli air campaign and yet with many of its major weapons programs still operational, and having demonstrated a newfound ability to threaten global maritime traffic through the strait. At the same time, Iran’s proxies, though also battered, will retain the ability to inflict significant harm on Iran’s neighbors whenever Tehran decides they should do so.

And for their part, while the US and Israel can justifiably take solace in having inflicted considerable damage on Iran’s leadership ranks, military-industrial complex, navy, command-and-control networks and nuclear program, they will have to reckon with the reality that the Iranian regime will depart this war still in power and with the ability to challenge US and Israeli interests in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. Therefore, even as this conflict likely fades a bit from view over the next few months, it’s already clear that the contours of the next regional conflict are visible on the horizon.