KYIV, UKRAINE - OCTOBER 10: Firefighters battle flames at a thermal power plant following a series of explosions on October 10, 2025 in Kyiv, Ukraine. The fire broke out after a Russian Shahed-136 drone hit a residential building during an overnight attack on Kyiv. The battlefields in Ukraine are increasingly having global energy consequences.
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Russian missiles continue pounding Ukraine’s energy infrastructure despite President Vladimir Putin’s unilateral declaration of a ceasefire on May 9th. Earlier, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced the suspension of Kazakh crude oil supplies via the Druzhba pipeline to Germany starting May 1st. This pipeline, which became operational in the 1960s, runs from Tatarstan, Russia, and branches through Belarus and Ukraine to supply Germany and Poland via the northern branch, and Slovakia and Hungary via the southern branch. While Novak claimed the move to stop the flow of oil from Kazakhstan contracted by Germany was due to "technical possibilities," the PCK Schwedt refinery near Berlin, which supplies most of Berlin’s fuel and relies on Kazakhstan for 17% of its crude supplies, will be hit hardest. In seeking to wean themselves from Russian oil, the Germans made an error—they continued to depend on Russian infrastructure for delivery. Germany was also addicted to the Russian gas way past the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine, low cost and ease of access being too tempting to give up despite geopolitical dependence.
Amid aggravating fuel shortages caused by the Iran war, Russia is trying to generate another energy crisis in Europe. This should serve as a reminder that Moscow still retains influence over parts of Eurasia’s energy map. Yet the bigger story may be that each disruption strengthens the case for bypassing Russia altogether. What was once an unquestioned Russia-centered energy system is gradually becoming something more fragmented. As that fragmentation continues, Russia is incentivized to use what leverage it has before it loses it. The increasing frequency of these coercive actions is a sign of Russian weakness, not strength.
For decades, Russia occupied a unique geopolitical position. It was not only one of the world’s largest producers of oil and gas, but also the principal transit gatekeeper linking Central Asian resources to Europe and global markets. Soviet-era-planned pipelines and export terminals made the Russian Federation the central node through which much of Eurasian energy moved.
ANKARA, TURKIYE - OCTOBER 21: An infographic titled "Russia struggles to make up for gap left by Europe in natural gas exports" is created in Ankara, Turkiye on October 21, 2022. The core problems of Russian geoeconomic isolation have not been overcome during the course of the war in Ukraine.
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That model is now under pressure. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western and Central Asian governments have accelerated efforts to reduce dependence on Russian-controlled routes. The result is the emergence of alternatives that would have been economically unrealistic only a few years ago. Nevertheless, while other routes are feasible, fully coming online and handling the volume currently handled by existing Soviet-era infrastructure requires a combination of political will, coordinated capital flows, tightly controlled infrastructure construction, and about a decade of development if all goes well.
Two countries illustrate the shift most clearly: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
Azerbaijan is one of the main beneficiaries of this change, as Baku is actively repositioning itself to become a new energy hub. Its state company SOCAR, which operates both the upstream production and transit via the Southern Gas Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, is expanding into European refining. The company received approval from the European Commission to acquire Italiana Petroli, marking another step forward in the growing EU-Azerbaijan energy partnership.
The company is also expanding its energy ties with China. Earlier this year, SOCAR’s president, Rovshan Najaf, met with Ren Wenjun, the chairman of BGP Inc., to discuss how their joint venture could emerge as a strategic supplier to Europe via the Southern Gas Corridor. However, Azerbaijan is far from completely filling Russia’s shoes, as the country has yet to expand oil output to full capacity. Its oil production in 2025 even fell by roughly 432,000 barrels per day compared with 2024.
Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has increased oil tanker shipments through the Trans-Caspian route, shipping crude across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and onward to the EU. This corridor, long constrained by Moscow and Tehran, relies on routes that avoid Russia. This growth is mainly due to rising investment in the country’s main oil fields (Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak), which generate about 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports and roughly 40% of national export revenue. The Central Asian country also has the option to ship oil via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to the Mediterranean, as well as using a pipeline with a capacity of 400,000 barrels per day to Western China. Despite this, Astana currently has too few tankers passing through the Trans-Caspian corridor, and the port of Kuryk can handle only 200,000 bpd. The alternative is to ship oil to Azerbaijan via Russia, which Moscow is unlikely to agree to unconditionally.
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan sit at the center of several overlapping and competing geoeconomic corridors in Eurasia. Their initiatives will be key to shaping the contours of energy flows across Eurasia.
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Despite numerous sanctions imposed on its energy exports, as well as Ukrainian drone attacks on its energy infrastructure, such as the damaging attack on the port of Tuapse that occurred on April 30th, sparking a huge fire, Russia remains a major oil and gas producer. In 2025, the country exported 238 million tons of oil, with about 80% going to China and India. In the two weeks that followed the start of the U.S.-Israel war with Iran, Moscow earned €6 billion from fossil fuel exports as oil prices spiked worldwide. This represented a €672 million increase for March, compared with February. From that increase, €625 million came from crude exports. Last month, U.S. President Donald Trump suggested easing sanctions on Russia, noting that Moscow can temporarily stabilize global energy markets while the situation in the Strait of Hormuz remains uncertain.
The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which carries large volumes of Kazakh crude to the Black Sea through Russian territory, remains one of Kazakhstan’s most important export routes. In the past, Russia has shown that it still holds leverage over Central Asian energy flows through legal procedures. In 2022, a Russian court ordered the CPC terminal to temporarily halt operations for 30 days due to paperwork issues. Last year, Moscow ordered the suspension of two of the three moorings at the CPC Black Sea terminal in Novorossiysk following inspections related to an oil spill that occurred in late 2024.
Despite Western sanctions, TurkStream continues to supply Russian gas to parts of southeastern Europe. Moscow even increased its gas exports via this pipeline by 10.3% in January last year compared with the previous year. Russian ports on the Baltic also remain significant outlets for crude and refined products. These terminals account for 47% of the country’s seaborne crude oil exports, with 22% departing from the port of Primorsk and 20% from Ust-Luga. However, Ukrainian drone strikes on Russia’s main Baltic ports have reduced export volumes to the point that the port of Ust-Luga has seen a 74% year-on-year drop in oil exports over the last 9 days of March 2026.
The short answer: not entirely, and certainly not immediately.
Azerbaijan lacks the production scale to fully replace Russian volumes, while Kazakhstan still faces tanker shortages, port bottlenecks, and continued reliance on inherited infrastructure. However, both countries are steadily expanding alternatives through the Southern Gas Corridor, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Trans-Caspian shipping, and deeper ties with Europe and China.
Russia remains one of the world’s largest oil and gas producers, with export infrastructure, including pipelines and ports, that still matters to both Europe and Asia. Routes such as the CPC, the TurkStream pipeline, and Baltic export terminals continue to give Moscow influence over regional energy flows. Russia also benefits from global crises, as seen during the Iran war, which helped generate billions in additional fossil fuel revenues.
We are witnessing a diversification shift: as Europe and Eurasia gain multiple suppliers and routes rather than relying on a single dominant gatekeeper, Russia’s pricing power and political leverage have declined substantially. With the U.S. blacklisting major Russian producers, including Rosneft and Lukoil, Moscow’s crude traded at an average 8.3% discount in the fourth quarter of 2025.
Russia may remain an energy power for years to come, but barring a major policy change in Moscow, it has lost its ability to shape Europe’s energy future and could see its dominance in Eurasia significantly reduced over the next decade.
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