The Embargo That Wasn’t

When Erdoğan announced his trade embargo in May 2024, researchers from multiple organizations tracked tanker movements and found the shipments continuing. One tanker made ten documented trips between the Turkish terminal and the Israeli port—eight of them after the embargo was declared.

The ships turned off their tracking signals in the Eastern Mediterranean and falsified manifests, listing Egypt as their destination but docking in Israel. Turkey's energy ministry insisted it had no control over where the oil went, citing the 1999 host government agreement that legally obligates Turkey to keep the pipeline running regardless of regional conflict.

That's the legal alibi. The strategic reality is more revealing.

Israel is one of Azerbaijan’s primary arms suppliers. That includes combat drones, long-range artillery, and a $1.2 billion surface-to-air missile system. Israeli-built drones were decisive in Azerbaijan’s 2020 victory over Armenia. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s state oil company recently secured a gas exploration license in the Mediterranean waters off Israel. The two countries' relationship has been described as "the most stable" Israel has with any Muslim country.

Azerbaijan is also Turkey’s closest ethnic and political ally. Erdoğan cannot squeeze Azerbaijan without fracturing that relationship and disrupting a military-industrial partnership on which Baku depends. Cutting the pipeline would devastate Turkey’s most important ally, not Israel's military might.

The triangle looks like this: Azerbaijani oil flows to Israel through Turkey. Israeli weapons flow back to Azerbaijan. Turkey collects a transit fee, and Erdoğan condemns the whole arrangement in speeches.

Dr. Ciddi, with Defense of Democracies, has been blunt about what is actually happening, notably that Turkey is suffering from extremely high inflation, unemployment, and poverty. “Azerbaijan has tried to mediate between Israel and Turkey. It can’t get Erdoğan to tone down his rhetoric. Everyone looks the other way and continues. Erdoğan hates Israel. Now he is trying to convince his citizens that Israel has its guns and sights on Turkey after Iran. He lives comfortably in a world of contradictions because he, along with everyone in his patronage network, profits from the relationship.”

A President Under Pressure

Erdoğan is cornered, as made explicit in March 2025. His government arrested Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu—his most formidable political rival—just days before İmamoğlu was to be formally nominated as the opposition's presidential candidate. The largest street protests Turkey had seen in over a decade erupted. Erdoğan's response: escalate his anti-Israel rhetoric

“It’s a perfect example of Erdoğan’s desperation,” Ciddi explains.

The hypocrisy cuts in multiple directions. While condemning Israeli military operations, Erdoğan has conducted sustained cross-border military campaigns against Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria, displacing tens of thousands of civilians.

Turkish airstrikes killed 12 on one day in October 2024. Their adversary? U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, which are Kurdish-led and the primary partner against ISIS. The logic Erdoğan uses—counterterrorism and national security—mirrors Israel’s stated rationale in Gaza. Only the target and the audience differ.

Some analysts argue that Erdoğan tries to navigate an impossible set of constraints. Writing in The Conversation, Burak Kadercan, professor of strategy at the Naval War College, describes Erdoğan’s approach as an attempt “to strike a balance between domestic politics and realpolitik on the international stage.”

Turkey, however, is a member of NATO, and a mediator does not call the other party's leader "the Butcher of Gaza" and demand his trial at The Hague. And a real negotiator does not imprison his country's most popular democratic politician on the same week he is denouncing authoritarian violence abroad.

Even Turkey's own deputy ambassador reportedly admitted to Israeli officials that Erdoğan's harsh rhetoric "stems from Erdoğan's political considerations."

The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline may be infrastructure. But it reflects poorly on a head of state who has built a brand on moral outrage while collecting transit fees on the very cargo he condemns. Erdoğan’s political survival depends on his voters overlooking the stark contradictions between his rhetoric and his actions.

Turkish officials have recently escalated their language over Israel’s strikes on Hezbollah in Lebanon, hinting at military confrontation. This language may resonate in some circles, though it is deeply problematic for U.S. allies. But as with Erdoğan’s Gaza rhetoric, the threats outpace reality: the oil still flows, the trade persists, and the underlying relationships remain intact.

“Erdoğan has a duplicitous relationship with NATO—the same as he does with Israel,” says Professor Ciddi. “Turkey enables the Russian war machine. Erdoğan likes having his feet in both camps, which is an issue for the allies. It is all deeply hypocritical and contradictory, but he needs the trade and profits.”

The speeches cost nothing. The pipeline pays. That’s not a contradiction—it’s the strategy. And it is a high-stakes gamble that Erdoğan may ultimately lose.